Marrying Up: The Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching by Ran Abramitzky et al.
This work is distributed as a Discussion Paper by the 
 








SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 09-030 
 
Marrying Up:  
the Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching 
 
By 







Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 
Stanford University 






The Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University supports research bearing on 
economic and public policy issues.  The SIEPR Discussion Paper Series reports on research and policy 
analysis conducted by researchers affiliated with the Institute.  Working papers in this series reflect the views 
of the authors and not necessarily those of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research or Stanford 
University. Marrying Up: 




Ran Abramitzky  Adeline Delavande Luís  Vasconcelos 
Stanford University  Universidade Nova de Lisboa 
and Rand Corporation 







We test the effect of a change in the sex ratio on marital assortative matching by social class 
using a large negative exogenous shock to the French male population due to WWI 
casualties. We analyze a novel data set that links marriage-level data to both French 
censuses of population and regional data on military mortality. We instrument the sex ratio 
in a region with military mortality, which exhibits exogenous geographic variation. We find 
that men married women of higher social class than themselves (married up) more in 
regions that experienced larger decreases in the sex ratio. A decrease in the sex ratio from 
one man for every woman to 0.90 men for every woman increased the probability that men 
married up by 8 percentage points. These findings shed light on individuals’ preferences for 
spouses. Rather than preferring to marry spouses from the same social class, men seem to 




JEL Code: J12, N34  
 
Keywords: Marriage, sex ratio, assortative matching, social classes. 
 
 
                                                 
* We thank Pedro P. Barros, Effi Benmelech, Marianne Bertrand, Nick Bloom, Leah Boustan, Tim Bresnahan, Raj Chetty, 
Dora Costa, Giacomo De Giorgi, Liran Einav, Marcel Fafchamps, Amy Finkelstein, Iliyan Georgiev, Avner Greif, Tim 
Guinnane, Christina Gathmann, Richard Hornbeck, Caroline Hoxby, Murat Iyigun, Seema Jayachandran, Naomi 
Lamoreaux, Michael Lovenheim, Victor Lavy, Soo Lee, Pierre-Carl Michaud, José Mata, Joel Mokyr, Muriel Niederle, Ben 
Olken, John Pencavel, Luigi Pistaferri, Gilles Postel-Vinay, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Emmanuel Saez, Izi Sin, Neeraj Sood, 
Nathan Sussman, Michele Tertilt, Gui Woolston, Yoram Weiss, Gavin Wright, and participants in numerous seminars and 
conferences for helpful discussions and comments. We thank Jean-Pierre Pélissier for kindly providing us with the 
marriage-level data from the TRA data set. We are grateful to Izi Sin for superb research assistance, and to Eduardo Perez 
for his assistance with translating the French censuses and with the mapping between the French occupation titles in the 
marriage data set and HISCO codes. Adeline Delavande acknowledges partial support from the EU grant MICROCON.    1
1. Introduction 
While the sex ratio has been shown to be an important determinant of marriage market 
outcomes such as marriage rates (e.g. Angrist, 2002), we still know little about the effect of the sex 
ratio on assortative matching. This is despite the fact that positive assortative matching by spouses’ 
characteristics is a well-known and widespread phenomenon,
1 and has important implications for 
social inequality, income redistribution, fertility, education, and labor supply (e.g. Fernandez and 
Rogerson, 2001). The main challenges in studying the effect of the sex ratio on assortative matching 
are the lack of appropriate marriage-level data and the endogeneity of the sex ratio.  
In this paper, we address these challenges by assembling a new marriage-level data set and 
using the large exogenous shock World War I (WWI) casualties caused to the French male population 
to test the effect of a change in the sex ratio on marital assortative matching by social class. We 
analyze a novel data set that links marriage-level data to both French censuses of population and 
regional data on military mortality. We instrument the sex ratio in a region with military mortality, 
which exhibits exogenous geographic variation. We find that men married women of higher social 
class than themselves (married up) more in regions that experienced larger decreases in the proportion 
of men in the population. 
We exploit the regrettable fact that WWI, one of the deadliest conflicts in recent human history, 
produced an exogenous and unusually large shock in the French male population. Approximately 
16.5% of French soldiers were reported dead or missing after the war (Huber, 1931). The First World 
War in France provides an ideal setting to test the effect of the sex ratio on marriage by social class for 
the following reasons. First, the ratio of men aged 18 to 59 to women aged 15 to 49 decreased 
exogenously as a result of the military mortality, from 1,087 men per 1,000 women in 1911 to 992 men 
per 1,000 women in 1921.
2 Second, military mortality varied substantially across regions, ranging from 
10% to 20% (see Figure 1.1), largely because men served in regiments with others from their regions, 
and different regiments were sent to battles of different intensities. This variation generated substantial 
heterogeneity in sex ratios across regions, reaching 864 men per 1,000 women in some regions, which 
allows us to test the impact of a change in the sex ratio on assortative matching. Finally, unlike in 
many other wars, military mortality was essentially uniform across social classes, meaning that the 
distribution of social classes in the population remained largely unchanged by the war. This fact rules 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Hout (1982), Mare (1991), Kalmijn (1998), McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001), Blossfeld and 
Timm (2003). See also Pencavel (1998) and Rose (2001) for trends in assortative matching in the U.S.  
2 Since this war was fought in the battlefield, civilian mortality (which is more balanced across genders) was lower than in 
later major wars such as the Second World War.    2
out the hypothesis that changes in marriage by class following the war were mechanically driven by 
changes in the distribution of people across classes.  
Analyzing the impact of the sex ratio on assortative matching is not only interesting per se, but 
may also improve our understanding of the causes of the marital assortative matching observed in so 
many societies. There are several possible explanations for why individuals tend to marry people with 
similar characteristics under a balanced sex ratio. One possibility is that individuals have horizontal 
preferences. That is, they choose spouses with similar social status simply because they derive more 
utility from marrying people like themselves.
3 Alternatively, individuals may have vertical preferences, 
and thus prefer to marry others of higher social status, but they cannot, because people of higher social 
status do not want to marry them.
4 Finally, assortative matching may be a consequence of individuals 
having the opportunity to meet only people who share their characteristics. If individuals marry by 
social class because they intrinsically have horizontal preference, or because they meet only potential 
partners with the same background, an exogenous decrease in the proportion of men in the population 
would have no effect on assortative matching: men would continue to marry women of the same social 
class. If instead individuals prefer spouses of higher class than themselves, the same decrease in the 
proportion of men, which improves the position of men in the marriage market, would enable them to 
marry women from higher social classes, who were previously inaccessible.  
Our empirical analysis uses a new data set that links non-public marriage-level data to French 
censuses of population and regional data on military mortality. Social classes are assigned to 
individuals using marriage certificate data that provide detailed information on the specific occupations 
of the brides, grooms, and their parents. Based on their occupations (or the characteristics of their 
families for women without occupations), we assign individuals to one of seven ordered social classes 
using the Historical International Social Class Scheme (HISCLASS) developed by van Leeuwen and 
Maas (2005a). This thorough and impressive scheme that maps occupations to social classes is based 
on several dimensions of occupation such as whether it involves supervision of others, the skill level 
required to perform it, whether it is manual or not, and the associated economic sector. The classes in 
HISCLASS were carefully constructed to categorize individuals according to their life chances and 
reflect their social status. We note that, while social class is correlated with income, it encompasses 
                                                 
3 Sociologists and psychologists have extensively studied people’s desire to interact with others who are like them. See 
McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001) for a review of the sociology literature on homophily and its causes, and 
Huston and Levinger (1978) for a review of the experimental psychology literature showing how attraction is influenced by 
perceived similarities. Banerjee et al. (2009) show that individuals in India have very strong preferences for within-caste 
marriage. Rose (2005) presents several historical/anecdotal examples in which men are advised or tend to avoid marrying 
women of higher social status.  
4 See, for example, Burdett and Coles (1997) for a theoretical model.     3
several other dimensions that are relevant for marriage. For example, an individual’s social class also 
depends on her level of skill and therefore education, and on the social status and prestige associated 
with her occupation. 
There was considerable assortative matching by social class in France before WWI: 43% of 
men married women of the same social class, and the distance between the social classes of spouses 
was 1 or less for 68% of couples. In addition to the information used to assign social class, the 
marriage certificate data contain information on the place and date of the marriage, based on which we 
link the marriage-level data with the French censuses of 1911, 1921 and 1926.  These censuses contain 
region-level information that allows us to construct the sex ratio for all the French départements 
(regional units), as well as other département-level control variables. Finally, we link the marriage data 
to regional military mortality data from Huber (1931). 
          We use two complementary empirical strategies that exploit the exogenous regional variation in 
war mortality to analyze the effect of a decrease in the male population on assortative matching by 
social class. First, we use a difference-in-differences approach where military mortality is the 
“treatment,” to test the hypothesis that men married up more post war in regions with higher mortality. 
Second, we use an instrumental variable approach to test more directly the causal effect of the sex ratio 
on marriage outcomes. Specifically, we use the regional mortality rate as an instrument for the regional 
sex ratio, which may be endogenous because of factors such as non-random migration. We employ two 
alternative dependent variables to capture whether and to what degree men married women of higher 
classes (i.e., married up), namely (i) the difference between the social class of the bride and that of the 
groom; and (ii) a dummy for whether the groom married a bride of higher class than his.  
Overall, we find that the decrease in sex ratio caused by war-related mortality allowed men to 
marry higher class women. Specifically, a decrease in the (instrumented) sex ratio from one man for 
every woman to 0.90 men for every woman corresponds to (i) an improvement of the average class of 
bride for a given class of groom of 0.25, from an average class difference of 0.32 to 0.07.; and (ii) an 
increase in the probability that men would marry up of 8.0 percentage points.  
Starting with the seminal work of Becker (1973, 1974), economists have devoted considerable 
attention to understanding marriage markets.
5 Part of this effort has been to understand the impact of a 
change in the sex ratio on marriage outcomes such as marriage rates and fertility, though not 
assortative matching. Early examples include Cox (1940), Easterlin (1961), Guttenberg and Secord 
(1983). A potential problem of these studies, mitigated to a large extent in Angrist (2002), Charles and 
                                                 
5 For a review of the economics of marriages, see Weiss (1993).    4
Luoh (2005), Brainerd (2007), and Lafortune (2008), is that there may be reverse causality between 
sex ratios and marriage market outcomes.  
In addition to these articles, other work has pointed out additional adjustments in the marriage 
market induced by a change in the relative scarcity of men or women. Rao (1993), Grossbard-
Shechtman (1993), Botticini (1999), Botticini and Siow (2003) and Edlund (2000) suggest that one 
adjustment is through dowries. Becker (1974, 1981), Bergstrom (1994), Willis (1999), Neal (2004), 
among others, suggest that a consequence of the imbalance in sex ratio is the emergence of polygamy, 
including “serial polygamy” (divorce and re-marriage) and relationships leading to out-of-wedlock 
births. Becker (1973, 1981), Chiappori et al. (2001) and references therein point out that a possible 
adjustment is a change in the share of the surplus generated by marriage that is appropriated by each 
spouse. In this paper, we highlight marrying above one’s own class as another important adjustment, 
complementary to the ones mentioned above, when the scarcity of men increases.  
Another important issue in the empirical literature of the marriage market is the 
characterization of individuals’ preferences for spouses. This characterization is difficult because 
equilibrium outcomes in the marriage markets are not only determined by preferences, but also by the 
mechanisms that match men and women. One strand of the literature deals with the identification 
problem by performing structural estimations of marriage models using marriage outcomes data (e.g., 
Wong, 2003, Bisin et al., 2004, Choo and Siow, 2006). In a second strand of the literature based on 
speed and online dating data (e.g., Ariely, Hitsch and Hortacsu, 2006, Belot and Francesconi, 2006, 
Fisman et al., 2006, Lee, 2007) or matrimonial newspaper advertisements (Banerjee et al., 2009), the 
identification issue is overcome by the fact that individuals’ decision processes (rather than just final 
outcomes) are observed in environments where the matching mechanism is controlled. In our paper, 
the fact  that men marry up more in regions with lower sex ratios suggest that, on average, individuals 
prefer higher-class partners. This favors the hypothesis that assortative matching occurs because in 
equilibrium individuals cannot marry higher-class people, although they may wish to do so. In contrast 
to the other papers analyzing preferences for spouse, our strategy relies on the fact that a change in the 
sex ratio has a different impact on assortative matching depending on people’s preferences for spouses’ 
social class.  
Moreover, the social ascension of men in post-WWI France that we document enhances our 
understanding of the economic and social history of France after the Great War. Unbalanced sex ratios 
are, however, far from being limited to the past. Our paper suggests that we may observe social 
ascension of women in countries like China and India, where there are disproportionately many men 
relative to the number of women in the marriage market.    5
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the historical context surrounding 
WWI in France. In Section 3 we present the theoretical framework that motivates our empirical 
analysis of marriage by social class. Section 4 describes the data. In Section 5 we discuss how social 
classes are assigned to brides and grooms. In Section 6, we present the empirical strategy and results, 
and in Section 7 we conclude.   
 
2. Historical Context 
The First World War, or the Great War, was a global and deadly military conflict that lasted 
from July 1914 until November 1918. In this section, we present a brief description of the war-related 
mortality and its implications for the marriage market in France. The most relevant facts for our 
analysis are that the draft to the French army was nearly universal and the number of casualties 
enormous; that the sex ratio decreased dramatically; that military mortality was uniform across social 
classes; and that women’s occupations in the period analyzed were largely unaffected by the war. 
 
2.1  Mobilization and mortality during WWI in France: a global phenomenon 
During the war, France underwent universal mobilization. Over the war period, about 8 million 
Frenchmen born between 1867 and 1899 were drafted or voluntarily enrolled in the army (Huber, 
1931).
6 To highlight the scope of this mobilization, note that 8.8 million men aged 18 to 51 were 
registered in the 1911 census, and that the overall French population in 1911 was approximately 33.2 
million. Exemptions to the draft were extremely rare. During the war, the French army reviewed all 
exempt cases and drafted a large proportion of men who were initially exempted, including those who 
had been injured early in the war.  
As a result of this general mobilization and the violence of the conflict, military casualties were 
enormous. A total of 1.397 million men, or 16.5% of the enrolled soldiers and officers, were reported 
dead or missing in action at the end of the war. Military mortality was quite homogenous across 
military ranks: about 16% of French soldiers and 19% of French officers died or were reported 
missing. Similarly, mortality across occupations seems to have been quite uniform. Table 2.1 presents 
the distribution of fatalities by occupation at age 20, while Table 2.2 shows the distribution of the labor 
force by economic sectors from the 1906 and 1921 censuses.
7 Although the occupation categories 
                                                 
6 About 7.8 million men were drafted and 0.2 million enrolled voluntarily. In addition, 0.5 million foreigners and men from 
the French colonies joined the French army. Note that all the numbers presented in this subsection are taken from Huber 
(1931) unless otherwise noted. 
7 Mortality data on soldiers’ occupations when drafted are not available.  Data on occupation at age 20 were recorded 
during each individual’s military service.    6
differ slightly between the two tables, the distribution of fatalities by occupation is very similar to that 
of men in the labor force.
8 Moreover, the comparison between the 1906 and 1921 censuses in Table 2.2 
shows that there were only minor changes in the distribution of the labor force by sector during that 
period. In particular, note that women’s occupations were little affected by the war (see also Becker, 
1999 and Downs, 1995).  
Although mortality was uniform across military rank and occupation, there was substantial 
heterogeneity in mortality rates across geographical regions. In Section 4.3 we discuss this geographic 
variation in war mortality and its causes in more detail. In addition to military casualties, deaths among 
civilians were high during the period 1914 to 1918, with the peak of mortality being caused by the 
1918 Spanish flu epidemic. Among the civilian population, the mortality rate may have been higher for 
men than women, and the increase in mortality rate was the most striking for individuals aged 15 to 45. 
This is potentially another exogenous cause of the unbalanced sex ratio in the post-WWI period. 
Deaths from the Spanish flu will be reflected in our measure of the sex ratio but not in our measure of 
military mortality.  
 
2.2   Marriage market in France 
The 19
th century and the beginning of the 20
th century in France were characterized by a stable 
celibacy rate of 10% to 13.5%, and a high marriage rate (Dupaquier, 1988). The average marriage rate 
of the 1908 to 1913 period (i.e., the number of new spouses per 10,000 inhabitants) was 158, putting 
France at a high rank among European nations. Divorce was a rare phenomenon (around 4-6% of 
marriages), both before and after the war (Segalen, 1981).  
After the onset of the war, the total annual number of marriages diminished sharply, reaching 
its lowest value in 1915 (75,200 marriages compared with 247,900 in 1913). After 1915, the marriage 
rate started to increase again, though at a slow pace, as a system of regular permissions took place. By 
1919, the marriage rate exceeded its 1913 value. More than 2 million marriages took place in the 4 
years following the end of the war (Armengaud, 1965). While the marriage rate increased everywhere 
after the war, there was heterogeneity by region, with higher marriage rates on the Atlantic coast and in 
the industrial regions of Paris and Northern France (Huber, 1931).  
Figure 2.1 shows the total number of first marriages for women by cohort for the period 1900 
to 1950 and highlights how the war disturbed women’s marriage patterns. For women born in 1891 to 
                                                 
8 Beyond the numbers in Table 2.1, anecdotal evidence stresses that many elites and white collar workers perished during 
the conflict. Four hundred and fifty writers from the “Societe des gens de letters”, a writers’ organization, 833 former 
students of the Ecole Polytechnique and 230 from the Ecole Normale, both of which were prestigious universities, were 
killed during the conflict.    7
1895, the distribution of marriages is literally cut in half with a first part of the distribution before the 
conflict and the second part concentrated in a few years after the war. To some extent, the cohort 1886-
1890 experienced a similar effect. For women born in 1896-1900, the distribution of marriages is 
characterized by a large and narrow peak after the war.    
In addition to the changes in the timing of marriages due to the war, the marriage market was 
deeply affected by the sharp drop in the male population. The war mortality changed the sex ratio 
dramatically: while there were 997 men for every 1,000 women in 1911, the ratio became 909 for 
every 1,000 in 1921 (Huber, 1931). If we restrict to the population of marriageable age (18 to 59 years 
old for men and 15 to 49 years old for women
9), the sex ratio decreased from 1,087 men per 1,000 
women in 1911 to 992 men per 1,000 women in 1921, reaching 864 in some regions with high 
mortality rates.
10 If we focus on singles, widows and divorcees who were 30 or younger but of 
marriageable age, there were approximately 2 men for every 3 women (Huber, 1931).  
As a consequence of the imbalance in the sex ratio, many women remained single in the post-
war period. Figure 2.2 emphasizes the large increase in female celibacy rates as measured by the 
percentage of singles at age 50. In particular, Table 2.3 presents the results of regressions of the 
percentage of single women on mortality (or sex ratio) using census data (described in Section 4) and 
shows that more women remained single in departements with higher mortality rates.
11 Similarly, 
Figure 2.2 shows a large decrease in male celibacy rates among the individuals in cohorts affected by 
the war, suggesting that some men who would otherwise have remained single got married.  
Girard (1974) provides detailed information about the ways in which spouses met. For the 
period 1914-1930, the most common place was in their neighborhood (21%), followed by meeting at 
friends’ places (17%, including 10% of “arranged meetings”), at work (16%) and at a ball (13%). 
There was some heterogeneity across the husband’s occupation. Managers, employees, skilled workers 
and farmers were more likely to meet their spouse in their neighborhood, while unskilled workers, 
salesmen and craftsmen were more likely to meet their spouse at a ball (Bozon and Heran, 1987). 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
  A robust prediction of marriage models is that the position of men in the marriage market 
improves with a reduction in the ratio of men to women in the population. The objective of this section 
                                                 
9 15 and 18 years old are the minimum legal ages for marriage for women and men respectively.   
10 Authors’ calculation from French census data. 
11 We classify as single all women who have never been married, are widowed, or are divorced.    8
is to illustrate one mechanism through which a relative scarcity of men induces them to marry women 
of higher class.  
We consider the impact of a change in the sex ratio on marriage by class under different 
assumptions about individuals’ preferences for characteristics in a spouse and about the constraints 
they face in the marriage market.
12 For concreteness, we focus on a sudden decrease in the sex ratio 
when initially the number of men and women in the population were equal. Consider first the cases in 
which (i) individuals prefer partners with similar characteristics to themselves, i.e., men and women 
prefer to marry within class (horizontal preferences) and (ii) individuals only meet partners from their 
own class. In both cases, the analysis of the impact of a change in the sex ratio on marriage by class is 
straightforward. Men continue to marry women of their own class. The difference relative to the initial 
situation is that now a fraction of the women in each class remains single. 
     A natural framework to analyze the effect of changes in the sex ratio on marriage behavior 
when individuals prefer to marry up rather than within class is that of Burdett and Coles (1997) and 
Bloch and Ryder (2000) who apply to the marriage market the matching framework pioneered by 
Mortensen (1982), Diamond (1982) and Pissarides (1990). Burdett and Coles (1997) and Bloch and 
Ryder (2000) consider a marriage market with search frictions and heterogeneous agents. Each 
individual, man or woman, is characterized by a single real number; this number corresponds to an 
attractiveness index that measures how attractive the individual is to potential partners. If a man and a 
woman marry, the woman's gain from the marriage equals the man's index and man's gain from the 
marriage equals the woman's index. So, individuals gain more by marrying higher-index individuals. A 
crucial aspect of the model is that singles in the market meet singles of the opposite sex only every 
now and then − the search friction. When two singles meet, they observe each other's attractiveness 
index and decide whether to propose or not. A marriage occurs if both singles propose. If at least one 
of the singles does not propose, they separate and continue searching for another partner. Search costs 
are embodied in a discount factor that captures individuals’ impatience to get married. A single's 
decision to propose given contact with a potential partner depends on (i) the partner's index, (ii) the 
rate at which the single meets other singles of the opposite sex, and (iii) the single’s expectation about 
who will propose to her (or him) upon contact. 
             In this marriage market, proposing today as opposed to waiting introduces a tradeoff. Waiting 
allows the possibility of a higher index match, but is costly since individuals discount the future. 
                                                 
12 We abstract from the possibility that individuals cohabit instead of getting married because cohabitation was extremely 
rare in France around WWI. See Matouschek and Rasul (2008) for theory and evidence on why individuals choose to enter 
into a marriage contract rather than cohabit.     9
Classes emerge endogenously in equilibrium. Singles partition themselves into classes according to 
their index levels. To illustrate why this is the case, suppose that the attractiveness indices of men and 
women lie in the interval [0,1]. Consider now the problem faced by a man with the highest index. 
Every woman proposes to this man, thus he faces an unconstrained search problem. Consequently, his 
optimal strategy is a threshold strategy, i.e., to propose to women whose indices are above a given 
value, and not propose to other women. Let w1<1 denote this threshold value. A consequence of this 
behavior on the men's side is that women with index in (w1,1] are accepted by the highest-quality men 
and therefore by every type of men. Thus, all women in (w1,1] face the same unconstrained search 
problem. As such, their optimal strategy is to accept men with indexes above a certain threshold value 
and reject all others. Let m1 denote that threshold. Men with indices in (m1,1] form a class − they are 
the men of class one; and women with indices in (w1,1] also form a class--they are the women of class 
one. In equilibrium, men of class 1 only marry women of class 1, and vice versa. Consider now the 
highest-index woman w1 and the highest-index man m1 who remains on the market. Woman w1 is 
accepted by any man in [0, m1] and man m1 is accepted by any woman in [0, w1]. We can thus apply 
the same reasoning as above to obtain threshold values w2 and m2. Men with indices in (m2, m1] and 
women with indices in (w2, w1] form another class, class two. Again, women of class two only marry 
men of class two, and vice versa. Applying the same argument in a recursive way, we can obtain all the 
other classes. Therefore, in equilibrium there is assortative matching; men and women only marry 
individuals of the same class. In this model men and women would like to marry singles of higher 
classes, but they cannot. 
We now analyze the impact of a sudden reduction in the male population on equilibrium 
marriage behavior using this framework. A reduction in the male population affects the marriage 
market by affecting the rate at which singles meet. Assuming that a reduction in the male population 
(while keeping the female population constant) reduces the total number of meetings between singles, 
one immediately obtains that the meeting rate for single women decreases. Since a reduction in the 
meeting rate reduces a woman's prospects of meeting potential partners in the future, her valuation of 
rejecting a man in a contact and remaining single decreases. Thus, women become less selective and 
are willing to accept men of lower quality. Formally, with a reduction in the male population, there is a 
re-definition of the men's classes. Let m1, m2, m3..., mn denote the thresholds that initially define men's 
classes. A reduction in the male population implies a reduction in those thresholds. If that reduction is 
sufficiently severe, the number of classes of men may decrease.
13 If we additionally assume that with a 
                                                 
13 For a formal analysis of the impact of a change in the number of men on men's classes see Bloch and Ryder (2000).    10
reduction in the number of men the rate at which single men meet single women increases, then 
women’s classes also change. With a higher rate of meeting single women, a man's valuation of 
rejecting a woman in a given match and remaining single increases. As a consequence, men can afford 
to become more selective. Formally, this implies an increase in the thresholds w1, w2, w3...,wn  that 
define women’s classes. A consequence of a decrease in thresholds m1, m2, m3...,mn and/or an increase 
in thresholds w1, w2, w3...,wn is that men tend to marry higher-quality women. Putting it in terms of 
classes, and fixing classes as being those prior to the change in the sex ratio, this means that men of a 
given class now marry women of higher classes and women of a given class now marry men of lower 
classes than they did before the decrease in the male population. 
Other marriage models suggest other adjustments of the marriage market as responses to a 
relative scarcity of men. For example, in Becker's (1973, 1974 and 1981) frictionless model of the 
marriage market, an increase in men’s scarcity leads the average man to appropriate more of the 
surplus generated by his marriage. More recently, Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2001) presented a 
model of household bargaining and the distribution of resources inside the family. In their model, a 
reduction in the sex ratio increases men's bargaining power both within the household and in the 
marriage market.
14 Unfortunately, we do not have information on relative bargaining power within the 
household, so we cannot test this interesting implication of these theories. 
     
4. Data 
We use data from several sources, including a non-public marriage-level data set, pre and post-
war French censuses of population, and geographical data on the number of French war casualties. 
Because most of these data are unique and have not been used before, this section presents and 
discusses them in some detail. 
 
4.1. The TRA data set 
The TRA data set is the result of a survey, “l’enquête des 3,000 familles”, that collected data on 
the descendants of 3,000 couples who got married between 1803 and 1832 in metropolitan France. 
This project, undertaken by the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, aims at analyzing social 
and geographical mobility in France in the 19
th and 20
th centuries. Dupaquier (2004) presents in detail 
the sampling design and logistics of the data collection. We briefly summarize these below. 
                                                 
14 Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2009) is another recent theoretical paper that discusses the effect of the sex ratio on 
assortative matching. Iyigun and Walsh (2007) provide a model in which an asymmetry in the sex ratio in the marriage 
market produces gender differences in premarital investments and consumption.    11
The 3,000 families selected between 1803 and 1832 were representative of the French 
population at the time (one family per 10,000 inhabitants) living in mainland France. Data on birth, 
marriage and death certificates were collected. Geographical quotas were used to ensure geographical 
representativeness: the number of couples sampled per département was proportional to its population 
from the 1806 census.
15  Then, in each département, a random sample of couples was drawn among 
those whose name starts with the letters “TRA,” such as Trarieux, Trabit, etc… The letters TRA were 
chosen to allow names from various local dialects to be represented in the sample, as well as to ensure 
representativeness of all the social classes (Pélissier et al., 2005). Specifically, names starting with the 
letters TRA are believed to cut across all social classes in France. Naturally there are other ways to 
randomize to ensure representativeness, but selecting TRA names is more practical than most because 
documents in archives are typically organized by name. The descendants of the TRA families and their 
spouses were followed until 1986. To avoid an exponential growth of the sample size over time, the 
descendants of women (who lost their TRA name upon marriage) are not included in the sample. 
Dupaquier (2004) points out two potential biases in the TRA data set. The aristocracy might be under-
represented, and foreign males who  came to France after 1832 are not included in the sample.
16  
We obtain access to data from marriage certificates in two periods around WWI: 1909-1914 
and 1918-1928. These data contain the following information: year and département of marriage, ages 
and occupations of both spouses, and occupations of their parents.
17 In addition, we know whether the 
marriage took place in a rural area. We have observations on 1,688 marriages before the war and 4,509 
after it. 
 
4.2 The French censuses 
The French census data for the years 1906, 1911 and 1921 are available from Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (2007). The 1926 census data are available from archives 
at the library of the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). We link the year 
and département of each marriage in the TRA data set to département-level information available from 
the censuses. In particular, we construct for 1911, 1921, and 1926 the sex ratio in each département, 
                                                 
15 Departments are administrative units similar to counties. In 1870-1914, France had 87 départements. After WWI, the 
number increased to 90 because territories from Alsace-Lorraine lost in the 1870s were recovered. 
16 Nobles may sometimes be classified under the letter D (because they are called “de Tra” rather than “Tra”). Some nobles 
might thus have escaped the original design. In addition, while the proportion of farmers is correct when considering the 
period over which the overall TRA data set was collected (i.e. 1803-1986), farmers seem to be over-represented in the 
resulting sample for the period 1970-1986. This may raise some selectivity issues. To deal with this, the descendants of 
3,000 additional “TRA” couples who married between 1803 and 1832 have been followed. The sample we use is based on 
the data set constructed with all of the 6,000 TRA families (source: email conversation with Jean-Pierre Pélissier).   
17 Occupations are missing for about 5% of the grooms and 12% of the brides, and for over 40% of their parents.    12
which we define as the ratio of the number of males aged 18 to 59 to the number of females aged 15 to 
49, the age groups defined by the French census as marriageable age. The average sex ratio is 1.12 in 
1911 and 1.02 in 1921, when it ranges from 0.86 to 1.23.  
We also construct indicators of women’s occupations to capture, although imperfectly, the 
distribution of social class of potential brides faced by grooms.
18 Table 4.1 presents descriptive 
statistics of these variables for before the war (1906
19 or 1911) and after the war (1921).
20 It shows that 
there were few changes in the occupation structure of women. The only notable change is a shift from 
self-employment to working as employees.  
   
4.3 The military mortality data 
Huber (1931) provides the proportion of soldiers reported dead and missing by the military 
region in which they were enlisted. During WWI, continental France was separated into 22 military 
regions (Boulanger, 2001). While they do not exactly match administrative regions, we can allocate 
each département to a particular military region. We link marriages to regional mortality data based on 
the départements in which the marriages occurred.  
Figure 1.1 shows the geographical variation in military mortality rate. This mortality rate 
ranges from 10.5% in the Gouvernement Militaire de Paris (Paris military region) to 20.2% in the 
military region of Orleans. The mean mortality rate computed over the 22 regions is 16.5%; the median 
is 17.4%. Regions marked in darker red have higher mortality rates. Regions marked in full white 
correspond to a mortality rate of 11.9% or lower and regions marked in the darkest red correspond to a 
mortality rate of 20% or higher. 
In addition to the natural randomness associated with war casualties, a few other factors explain 
the regional heterogeneity in military mortality rate. During the first two years of the war, men residing 
in the same military region were typically sent to the same war zone.
  This was because soldiers served 
in their military regions of residence, or were sent together to the battlefront to complement the troops 
of the northeastern regions where most of the fighting was taking place (Boulanger, 2001; Maurin, 
1992).
21 The heterogeneity in military mortality during these years may thus be explained by the fact 
that men from different départements participated in battles of different violence levels. Military 
                                                 
18 The female occupations in the censuses are aggregated differently to our social classes. Moreover, the census occupation 
categories are not broken down by marital status. 
19 Comparable female occupations are not available for the 1911 census, so we use data from 1906 as our pre-war values. 
20 We present the average over 87 départements for 1906 and 90 départements for 1921 since France’s territories increased 
after the war.  
21 For example, soldiers from Bretagne were sent to the Parisian region, while soldiers from the Parisian region went further 
east.    13
mortality in 1914 and 1915 constitutes about 49 percent of the total military deaths during WWI: 23 
percent of the overall war casualties occurred in 1914, and 26 percent in 1915 (Becker, 1999).  From 
1916, men from different military regions were more mixed together at the battlefront, but the mixing 
was imperfect and some regional differences in mortality persisted.  
 
5. Assigning social classes based on the Historical International Social Class Scheme 
We use the data on individuals’ specific occupations from the marriage certificates to allocate 
brides and grooms to social classes. To do this, we first match each of over a thousand occupations 
present in our data set to a code from the Historical International Standard Classification of 
Occupations (HISCO). HISCO is a detailed coding system designed to facilitate the comparison of 
historical international data. It is based on the 1968 International Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ISCO68), and customized for historical data (van Leeuwen et al., 2002). HISCO 
allocates each occupation to one of 7 sectors: (1) Professional, (2) Technical and Related Workers 
Administrative and Managerial Workers, (3) Clerical and Related Workers, (4) Sales Workers, (5) 
Service Workers, (6) Agricultural, Animal Husbandry and Forest Workers, Fishermen and Hunters and 
(7) Production and Related Workers, Transport Equipment Operators and Laborers. Each of these 
sectors is itself divided into smaller sub-sectors. For example, codes of the type 6-xx.xx correspond to 
the agricultural sector. Codes of the type 6-2x.xx refer to agricultural workers. This last group includes 
codes of the type 6-22.xx for field crop and vegetable farm workers and these, in turn, contain more 
specific occupational categories such as wheat farm workers (coded as 6-22.30) (van Leeuwen and 
Maas, 2005a). The HISCO classification contains about 1,600 occupations characterized by 5-digit 
codes. We allocate to all the occupations in our data set a 5-digit HISCO code using a mapping 
available on the History of Work Information System website (http://historyofwork.iisg.nl/).  
Then, to map occupations into social classes, we use the Historical International Social Class 
Scheme (HISCLASS) developed by van Leeuwen and Maas (van Leeuwen and Maas, 2005a). The 
HISCLASS system is ideal for our purposes because it allocates each of the 1600 HISCO occupations 
into one of 12 social classes, where a “social class” is defined by van Leeuwen and Maas (2005a) as “a 
set of persons with the same life chances.” The mapping of occupations into social classes takes into 
account various dimensions of social status including whether the occupation is manual, the skill level 
required to perform the occupation, and the degree to which the occupation involves supervision of 
others. This mapping is the result of a combination of the views of expert historians and the 
classifications given in the 1965 Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT).  Expert historians were 
independently asked to classify HISCO occupations into social classes; DOT classifications are based    14
on observations in plants and businesses that assign grades along these dimensions to over 10,000 
occupation categories in US. In cases where the DOT and the experts disagreed, the experts’ opinions 
were taken. To increase the sample size in each class, in this paper we use the version of HISCLASS 
condensed into the following 7 social classes (class 1 being the highest, and class 7 being the lowest): 
•  Class 1: Higher managers and professionals 
•  Class 2: Lower managers and professionals, clerical and sales personnel 
•  Class 3: Foremen and skilled workers 
•  Class 4: Farmers and fishermen 
•  Class 5: Lower-skilled workers 
•  Class 6: Unskilled workers 
•  Class 7: Lower-skilled and unskilled farm workers 
This 7-class classification has been used in other works, and in particular in works using the 
TRA data set, to study social mobility and endogamy (Pélissier et al., 2005, Holt, 2005, Bull, 2005, 
Schumacher and Lorenzetti, 2005, Arrizabalaga, 2005, Lanzinger, 2005, Dribe and Lundh, 2005, Van 
de Putte et al., 2005, Bras and Kok, 2005, van Leeuwen and Maas, 2005b, 2005c). Table 5.1 provides 
examples of occupations for each of the classes for men and women. 
In Table 5.2, we present the distribution of brides and grooms when classified according to the 
above 7 social classes. Classes 3 and 5 are the most numerous among brides, while classes 3 and 4 are 
the most numerous among grooms.  
This occupation-based classification does not assign classes to brides without occupations 
(34% of the brides in our data). We use three alternative ways to deal with this issue. First, we exclude 
brides without occupations from the analysis. Second, we impute class for brides without occupations 
based on the individual and location characteristics that predict class for brides with occupations (see 
Table A1 in Appendix A). Specifically, we first use pre-war marriage data for brides with occupations 
to estimate the relationship between bride’s class and the classes of their groom, father, and mother; 
indicators for whether parents’ classes are missing and for whether parents are dead at the time of the 
wedding; an interaction of these variables with an indicator for whether the wedding took place in a 
rural area; bride’s age; and city size. Then, we use this relationship to impute classes for brides without 
occupations. We note that for brides without occupations, however, we do not want to use groom’s 
class to impute bride’s class because this will impose the same relationship between spouses’ classes 
pre and post war, whereas vertical preferences imply that this relationship differed pre and post war. 
Therefore, for the imputation of the class of brides without occupations, we use the relationship we    15
estimated above, but, in place of the class of the groom, we use the pre-war average class of the 
grooms among brides without occupations in the departement. The underlying assumption is that the 
average class of these grooms pre-war is informative about the classes of the brides without 
occupations in a given region. The average imputed class of brides without occupations is 3.87 before 
the war, and 3.85 after.
22 Finally, as a robustness check, we use an alternative imputation method: we 
impute the classes of brides without occupations with their fathers’ classes. The main drawback of this 
second approach is that father’s class is often missing (37.0% of the observations among brides 
without occupations), and not necessarily at random.  
There are a few potential issues with using occupations as a measure of social class to compare 
assortative matching before and after the war. First, the unbalanced sex ratio could potentially induce 
individuals to change their occupations. This does not seem to have occurred in the short period 
analyzed in this paper, as the occupation distribution of men and women in the labor force changed 
very little after the war (see Table 2.2). Furthermore, we control for the distributions of women’s 
occupations in each department to account for department-specific potential changes in women’s labor 
force opportunities. Second, the unbalanced sex ratio may change age at marriage, which in turn may 
affect occupation at marriage. To address this potential issue, we control for the ages of brides and 
grooms, which allows us to capture the effect of the sex ratio on social class that goes beyond its effect 
on age.  
 
6. Empirical strategy and results 
  If men and women prefer higher class spouses, then we would expect men (women) to marry 
higher class women (men) when the sex ratio, i.e. the ratio of men of marriageable age to women of 
marriageable age, is lower (higher). Table 6.1 presents the average class of the brides for each groom’s 
class before and after the war. It shows that, outside of class 3 grooms, men married women of higher 
class (lower index) after the war than before the war. 
Before testing our main hypothesis, we establish that before WWI people tended to marry 
within class. We then use a difference-in-differences approach to test whether men married women of 
higher social class than themselves (married up) more post war in regions where more men died. 
Finally, we instrument the sex ratio in a region with military mortality to test more directly the effect 
of the sex ratio on assortative matching. 
                                                 
22 A simpler imputation method would be to use the pre-war average class of the grooms of brides without occupation to 
define the “class” of brides without occupation. The approach we take uses not only the information provided by the pre-
war average class of the grooms, but also individual-specific characteristics such as the location of marriage and the classes 
of the parents.    16
 
6.1. Pre-war assortative matching by social class 
We use pre-war data to test whether people marry within class as opposed to randomly. We do 
so by examining the distribution of social distance, defined as the class of the bride minus the class of 
the groom, among pre-war marriages. When people marry within class, the social distance is zero.   
To implement this test, we compare the realized distribution of social distance with the 
distribution we would expect under the null hypothesis that pre-war grooms married randomly. Using a 
bootstrapping method, we construct 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for the distribution of social 
distance under the null hypothesis of random matching. Specifically, denote the number of pre-war 
marriages in our sample by N.  From the distribution of groom classes, we draw N grooms randomly 
with replacement; from the distribution of bride classes we draw N brides randomly with replacement.  
We match the list of grooms with the list of brides, and derive the distribution of social distances for 
this simulated set of marriages.  We repeat this process 1000 times and construct the 95 percent 
confidence interval.   The observed points in Figure 6.1 show the actual distribution of pre-war social 
distance for the marriages in our sample. The observed distribution lies outside the confidence interval 
for most social distances. For brides and grooms of the same class, the observed proportion is nearly 
twice as large as the upper boundary of the confidence interval.  For the other social distances between 
-4 and +4, the observed proportions lie close to or below the lower bounds of the confidence intervals.  
For the extreme social distances, the observed proportions are approximately zero. 
Overall, the figure clearly rejects the null hypothesis of random matching. Grooms in the pre-
war period were much more likely to marry brides of their own social class than chance would dictate, 
and were much less likely to marry brides who were socially distant from them.  
 
6.2 The effect of military mortality on assortative matching: difference-in-differences approach 
To test the hypothesis that men married up more post war in regions with high mortality, we 
estimate difference-in-differences regressions where military mortality is the “treatment.” In particular, 
we estimate: 
, ijt M j P t j t jt ijt ijt YM P W M P W X Z λ λλ μ δ ε =++ × + + +        (1) 
where i is a marriage, j is a military region, and t is the year of the wedding. We use two alternative 
dependent variables Y: (1) the difference between the class of the bride and the class of the groom (a    17
lower value means the man married up more); and (2) a dummy for whether the groom married a bride 
of his own class or higher.
 23 
j M is the mortality rate due to the war in military region j,  t PW  is a post-war dummy variable 
that equals one if the wedding took place after the war and zero otherwise, which captures aggregate 
factors that would cause changes in Y.  j t M PW ×  is the interaction of these two variables. The 
coefficient of interest is therefore λ.  X jt are other controls that vary across geography and time, such 
as variables capturing the occupational distribution of the population of women in the area. Zijt are 
additional controls that vary at the individual level such as groom class dummies, age and whether the 
marriage took place in a rural area. The variables used in the analysis are described in more detail in 
Appendix B. We cluster standard errors at the military region level.   
Table 6.2 shows the estimation results of equation (1). The regressions suggest that men were 
more likely to marry up after the war in places with higher mortality rates, as the coefficients of 
mortality interacted with the post-war dummy are of the right sign and statistically significant at 1% in 
all the specifications. For example, in the regressions predicting whether the groom married up 
(columns 3 and 4), the coefficient on military mortality interacted with the post-war dummy is 0.021 in 
the specification excluding brides without occupation, and 0.018 in the specification where the class of 
the brides without occupation is imputed. This coefficient implies that in a region where the military 
mortality is 20%, the probability that a given groom marries up is 18 percentage points higher than in a 
region where the military mortality is 10%, from a pre-war average of marrying up equal to 59.5%. 
24 
We note that in all the regressions, the coefficient associated with the mortality rate is not 
statistically significantly different from zero, suggesting that the pre-war marriage patterns in regions 
that experienced low mortality during the war were similar to those in high mortality regions.  
We include as independent variables the percentages of the female labor force in the different 
occupations available from the censuses to reflect the composition of the pool of brides available to a 
groom. The coefficients indicate that men tended to marry women of higher class when the 
                                                 
23 Note that our regressions include only men who actually married, so we face a sample selection issue.  Although this 
means we are unable to test the model’s prediction that low class women will be more likely to remain single when men are 
more scarce, it does not affect our testing of the prediction that men will marry up more when men are more scarce. 
24 Note that the estimations do not take into account the proportion of injured by military regions, since no such data are 
available. A potential concern is that men who were severely injured might have had less marriage opportunities, which 
may affect our results. After the war, 920,000 of the survivors were eligible to receive a pension from the state because of 
their disability (Corvisier, 1992). As a simple exercise, consider the limit case in which all those receiving a pension were 
unable to get married. Military mortality totaled 1,227,796 men, so the sum of mortality plus injured is 2,147,796.  Treating 
all these men as military deaths implies we should scale our coefficients by (1,227,796 / 2,147,796), which is equal to 0.57.  
Hence, under this extreme assumption, the coefficients would decrease in magnitude by 43%.    18
percentages of proprietors (typically owners of very small stores) and employees were higher. We also 
include an indicator for whether the wedding took place in a rural area, where marriage patterns might 
have been different. We find that, everything else equal, grooms in rural areas married lower class 
brides than grooms in urban areas.  Finally, we control for the ages of the bride and groom to address 
the fact that older grooms or brides may have better occupations, and may thus be of higher class. 
Table 6.2 shows that, everything else equal, older men and men marrying younger brides were more 
likely to marry up.
25  
Our results are robust to the alternative imputation method for brides without occupation; Table 
A2 in Appendix A shows similar results when we use father’s class to impute bride’s class for brides 
without occupations. In all the specifications with imputed bride classes, the coefficient of interest 
tends to be smaller in magnitude than that obtained when excluding the brides without occupation. 
This may be due to measurement error in the imputed classes of the brides without occupations that 
biases the coefficient toward zero.  
 
Placebo regressions 
As a robustness check, we use pre-war data to estimate difference-in-differences “placebo” 
regressions, in which we falsely assume that the war took place between 1911 and 1912. This allows 
us to test for pre-existing regional differences in marriage patterns. We expect this placebo treatment to 
have no effect on marriage patterns. Table 6.3 presents the estimation results. The coefficients 
associated with mortality rate interacted with the post-1911 dummy are small and statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that the results presented in Table 6.3 are not driven by 
changes in marriage patterns that occurred right before the war. 
 
6.3. The effect of the sex ratio on assortative matching: an instrumental variable approach 
To directly test the effect of the sex ratio on assortative matching, we instrument the sex ratio in 
a region with regional military mortality rates. We need to instrument for the sex ratio because, as 
pointed out in the literature (e.g., Angrist, 2002, Kerwin and Luoh, 2005), studies that analyze the 
impact of the sex ratio on the marriage market may suffer from omitted variable bias and possibly 
reverse causality. For example, in our context, a low sex ratio may indicate strong male out-migration. 
If migrants are selected positively or negatively according to unobservable variables that are relevant 
                                                 
25 As an additional robustness check, we control for whether the bride or the groom was remarrying (results not presented).  
The coefficients on these controls are small and insignificant, and their inclusion does not affect the coefficients on the 
mortality rate.    19
for marriage outcomes (e.g., groom’s ability or health), the random error term in a simple OLS 
regression of marriage outcomes on the sex ratio may be correlated with the sex ratio.
 26  
For our strategy to be valid, we need an instrument that predicts the sex ratio but is not directly 
related to marriage outcomes. We use military mortality, which exhibits exogenous geographical 
variation, as an instrument for the département-level sex ratio. Given the universality of the military 
draft, military mortality is correlated with the post-war sex ratio. However, we do not expect military 
mortality to have a direct effect on marriage by social class.  
In the first stage, we regress the sex ratio on military mortality interacted with post war and on 
the same controls used in the second stage. The second stage of our IV specification is: 
, ijt jt jt ijt j t ijt YSXZ λ μδα β ε =+ ++ + +  (2) 
where i is a marriage, j is a military region, and t is the year of the wedding and the dependent variable 
Y is defined as before. The independent variable of interest is the sex ratio jt S , which is instrumented 
with military mortality. We set military mortality to zero for marriages that occurred before the war. 
The sex ratio is not measured at the time of the wedding, but rather at the census year closest to the 
wedding.
27 This introduces some measurement error that will be identical for all weddings taking place 
in the same year and region. We thus cluster the standard errors at the level of the marriage year 
interacted with military region.  
                                                 
26 Take for example the case of health (denoted here by  ijt H ) as an omitted variable that is correlated with the sex ratio 
because of migration. The correct OLS specification should be: 
. ijt jt jt ijt ijt j t ijt YS X Z H λ μδηα β ε =+ + + + + + +   (3) 
where i is a marriage, j is a military region, and t is the year of the wedding and the dependent variable Y is defined as 
before. The independent variable of interest is the sex ratio. If equation (3) is the correct specification but we omit  ijt H  
from the estimation, the expected value of the estimator ofλ  will be:
  










λλ η =+  
We expect good health to improve the groom’s position in the marriage market, i.e. if  ijt Y  denotes the dummy for marrying 
up, we expect  0. η >  The direction of the omitted variable bias thus depends on the sign of  () cov , jt ijt SH , where  jt S  
denotes the sex ratio. If migrants tend to be in better health than non-migrants, we expect to find men in better health than 
average in places with high sex ratios ( () cov , 0 jt ijt SH > ), in which case the estimator of λ  will be biased upward. If 
migrants tend to be in poorer health than non-migrants, the estimator of λ  will be biased downward. Note that when we 
use the difference between the class of the bride and the class of the groom or a dummy for whether the groom married a 
low class bride as dependent variables, we expect  0 η <  to capture that good health improves the groom’s position in the 
marriage market. In the regressions with those dependent variables, we therefore expect a downward bias if migrants are 
more likely to be in good health than non-migrants, and an upward bias if migrants are more likely to be in poor health. 
27 Marriages in the period 1909 to 1914 use the 1911 sex ratio, marriages in the period 1918 to 1923 use the 1921 sex ratio, 
and marriages in the period 1924 to 1928 use the 1926 sex ratio.    20
The regression includes military region dummies  j α  and marriage year dummies  t β . As an 
alternative specification, we replace the year dummies with a post-war dummy. Otherwise we include 
the same controls as in the difference-in-differences estimation.  
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show the estimation results when excluding and when imputing brides 
without occupations, respectively. The results suggest that men were more likely to marry up after the 
war in places with lower sex ratios. The coefficient associated with the instrumented sex ratio is 
statistically significant at conventional levels in all specifications. The IV regression predicting class 
difference (column 1 of Table 6.5) suggests that a decrease in the sex ratio from one man for every 
woman to 0.90 men for every woman would improve the expected class of bride married by a given 
groom by 0.25 from an average class difference of 0.32 to 0.07. Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 6.4 and 6.5 
present the IV regression results predicting whether the groom married up. In column 3, Table 6.5, the 
coefficient on the sex ratio is -0.804, implying that a decrease in the sex ratio from one man for every 
women to 0.90 men for every woman would increase the probability a given groom married up by 8.0 
percentage points.  
Using year dummies or a post-war dummy does not change the coefficients. The results are 
similar when using father’s class for brides without occupations (Table A3 in Appendix A), though the 
coefficients are less precisely estimated. 
Tables A4 and A5 show the estimation results of equation (2) estimated by OLS. The 
coefficient associated with the sex ratio mostly has the right sign but is much smaller in magnitude. 
This could suggest that endogeneity of the sex ratio is important. The difference between the IV and 
the OLS estimates is consistent with migrants being positively selected (e.g., in better health).  
Some potential concerns when using sex ratio in the year of marriage are that a groom may 
choose when he marries in order to face a more advantageous sex ratio, and that marriages may be 
decided on some time before they actually occur. These issues may inflate the coefficients we find on 
the sex ratio. To deal with them, we use an alternative definition of the sex ratio. We allocate to each 
marriage the sex ratio closest to the time when the groom turned 18, i.e. when he became legally 
allowed to get married.
28 Tables 6.6 and 6.7 show that our results are unchanged when using this 
alternative definition of the sex ratio. 
The results in this section and Section 6.2 show that men marry up more in places with higher 
mortality and lower sex ratio. We take this as evidence that on average men prefer women of higher 
                                                 
28 We, however, do not allocate pre-war sex ratios to post war marriages, because it seems implausible that men pre war 
would have predicted the high military mortality rate and thus delayed marriage in order to face less competition in the 
marriage market.     21
class, i.e. that men have vertical preferences. As discussed in Section 3, if grooms had horizontal 
preferences a decrease in the sex ratio, which improves men’s position in the marriage market, would 
not lead grooms to marry up more. Rather, it would leave assortative matching unchanged. Thus, our 
results favor the hypothesis that the assortative matching by social class that we observe at the 
beginning of the 20
th century in France occurred because in equilibrium individuals could not marry 
higher-class people, although they preferred to do so.  
We have presented our empirical results under the perspective of men marrying up. However, 
the counterpart is that women marry down. Our results thus shed light on women’s preferences for 
being married: women prefer marry men of a lower social class than to remain single.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Although the similarity of spouses to each other along various dimensions has been 
documented, we know little about its causes. This paper uses an exogenous shock to the sex ratio 
created by WWI mortality in France to identify the underlying mechanisms responsible for marital 
assortative matching by social class. Overall, we find that the decrease in the proportion of men in the 
population due to war-related mortality allowed men to marry higher class women. Men experienced 
“social ascension” by marrying women from classes to which they had little chance of marriage before 
the war. Similarly, the change in sex ratio led women of higher classes to marry grooms from lower 
classes than they would have under pre-WWI standards. A decrease in the sex ratio, instrumented for 
by military mortality, from one man for every woman to 0.90 men for every woman: (a) increased the 
probability that men married women of higher social class than themselves by 8.0 percentage points, 
(b) improved the expected class difference for a given groom by 0.25. Our results favor the hypothesis 
that assortative matching occurs because, although individuals would rather marry higher-class people, 
they do not receive marriage proposals from them.  
This paper illustrates a forgotten consequence common to brutal wars and imbalances in the sex 
ratio such as the one observed nowadays in China: the change in social mobility through change in 
marriage behavior. One may wonder whether the war induced a transitional or permanent change in 
social mobility and social integration. This is left for future research. On this specific front, an obstacle 
to overcome is the occurrence of WWII which may hinder the analysis of the long-term implications of 
WWI on social mobility. Another natural extension is to examine the extent of marrying up in other 
countries that participated in WWI. Such a study could shed light on the differences in social mobility 
across countries.    22
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This map shows the geographic variation in the percentage of soldiers killed.  Totally 
white corresponds to a mortality rate of 11.9%, the 5
th percentile; totally red corresponds 
to a mortality rate of 20.0%, the 95
th percentile.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Number of first marriages per 1,000 women by birth cohorts and years 




26Figure 2.2: Percentage of singles at age 50 by birth cohort 











27Table 2.1: Distribution of fatalities by occupation at age 20 (in %) 
Source: Huber (1931) 




Liberal professions  2.4 
Civil servant  1.3 
Domestic 4.2 
Clergy 0.2 





Table 2.2: Distribution of the labor force by sector (in %) 
Source: Huber (1931). Repartition using 1906 territory for both years 
 1906  1921 
Sectors  males females males females 
Fishing  0.6 0.1 0.6  0 
Agriculture and forestry  43.8  43.2  39.9  45.9 
Industry and transportation  37.9  32.7  41.8  28.7 
Sales  10.4 10.1 10.4 11.7 
Liberal  professions  2.4 2.5 2.3 3.4 
Public  service  3.5 1.3 4.2 2.3 
Domestic 1.4  10.1  0.8  8 




Table 2.3: Women were more likely to be unmarried in areas with higher mortality 
rates and lower sex ratios 
Dependent variable: fraction of women who aren't married   
 (1)  (2) 
    
% of Soldiers Killed * Post War  0.002***   
 (0.000)   
Sex Ratio    -0.295*** 
   (0.023) 
Departement Dummies  Yes  Yes 
    
R-Squared 0.911  0.911 
Observations 256  260 
Notes: Each column is an OLS regression where an observation is a departement in a 
census period (1911, 1921 or 1926).  The sex ratio is defined as men aged 18-59 divided 
by women aged 15-49 in the departement.  Unmarried women include women who have 
never been married, widowed women, and divorced women.  Standard errors are given in 
parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
28 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics 
      Pre War  Post War 
     
Mean  Standard 
deviation  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Sex ratio  1.12  0.09  1.02  0.08 
% Female managers  43.3  13.0  41.5  12.5 
% Female employees  3.8  1.2  7.6  3.3 
% Female workers  29.3  7.7  29.9  7.9 
% Self-employed females  23.1  7.2  19.6  5.5 
% Unemployed females  0.5  0.5  1.4  1.4 
The pre-war statistics are from 1911 for the sex ratio and 1906 for the female occupations; the post-war 
values are all from 1921.    
 
 
Table 5.1. Examples of common occupations within each class 
Class  Women  Men 
1  Accountant, professor  Accountant, engineer 
2  Store employee, bank employee  Railway company employee, store 
employee 
3  Seamstress, cook  Mechanic, constructor 
4  Farmer, winegrower  Farmer, winegrower 
5  Domestic, linen maid  Driver, domestic 
6  Factory worker, worker  Factory worker, worker 
7  Day laborer, farm worker  Day laborer, farm worker 
 
 
Table 5.2: Distribution of grooms and brides by class 
   Grooms  Brides 
Classes  Pre-WWI  Post-WWI  Pre-WWI  Post-WWI 
1  5.4  7.1  0.7  1.2 
2  17.8  20.3  6.3  10.5 
3  24.1  24.2  20.1  13.3 
4  22.9  22.3  9.8  10.5 
5  19.9  16.8  21.9  18.2 
6  5.4  5.4  4.2  4.1 
7  4.0  3.2  2.7  1.8 
No occupation  0.6  0.8  34.4  40.5 
N  1,605  4,254  1,482  3,950 
29 
Table 6.1. Average class of the brides for each groom’s class before and after the 
war 
  Average bride's class 
Groom class  Pre-war  Post-war  
1  3.4  3.2 
2  3.6  3.4 
3  3.7  3.8 
4  4.2  4.1 
5  4.2  4.1 
6  4.6  4.6 
7  5.2  4.9 
 
30Table 6.2: Men marry up more where military mortality was higher (OLS)
Dependent variable:
actual imputed actual imputed
% of Soldiers Killed * Post War -0.073*** -0.058*** 0.021*** 0.018***
(0.025) (0.019) (0.007) (0.005)
% of Soldiers Killed 0.018 0.027 0.010 -0.001
(0.026) (0.020) (0.012) (0.008)
Rural 0.300*** 0.265*** -0.061* -0.067***
(0.101) (0.055) (0.030) (0.019)
% Female Proprietors -0.013** -0.012*** -0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
% Female Employees -0.054*** -0.050*** 0.014*** 0.013***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.005) (0.003)
% Female Self-Employed -0.011 -0.010 0.005 0.002
(0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
% Female Unemployed -0.025 -0.026** 0.006 0.009**
(0.017) (0.012) (0.006) (0.004)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.128 0.318 0.271* 0.117
(0.342) (0.206) (0.130) (0.079)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.395 0.038 -0.205* -0.150*
(0.420) (0.307) (0.117) (0.079)
Post-War Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Groom Class Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.195 0.174 0.214 0.395
Observations 3,122 4,997 2,998 4,834
class difference married up
Notes: The dependent variable in the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of 
the groom (thus a greater class difference indicates the groom married a lower class of bride); the 
dependent variable in the third and fourth columns is a dummy variable for whether the groom 
married a bride of higher class than himself.  The first and third columns exclude brides without 
occupations; the second and forth columns impute the classes of brides without occupations as 
described in Section 5.
The female occupation variables are expressed as percentages of the female labor force for the 
departement; the omitted category is workers.  Standard errors, clustered at the military region 
level, are presented in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
31Table 6.3: Placebo regression pretending the war took place between 1911 and 1912 (OLS)
Dependent variable:
actual imputed actual imputed
% of Soldiers Killed * Post 1911 0.025 0.008 -0.009 -0.002
(0.019) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007)
% of Soldiers Killed -0.045 -0.019 0.018 0.007
(0.044) (0.032) (0.018) (0.013)
Rural 0.323** 0.265*** -0.077 -0.079**
(0.145) (0.091) (0.048) (0.029)
% Female Proprietors -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002
(0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
% Female Employees -0.086 -0.077 -0.013 0.000
(0.073) (0.050) (0.030) (0.020)
% Female Self-Employed 0.010 0.004 -0.002 -0.000
(0.013) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
% Female Unemployed -0.140 -0.102 0.105 0.053
(0.174) (0.117) (0.081) (0.055)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.419 0.580 0.045 -0.032
(0.727) (0.456) (0.252) (0.160)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.066 0.329 -0.036 0.026
(0.744) (0.477) (0.202) (0.184)
Post-1911 Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Groom Class Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.192 0.182 0.265 0.377
Observations 915 1,356 871 1,303
class difference married up
Notes: The dependent variable in the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of 
the groom (thus a greater class difference indicates the groom married a lower class of bride); the 
dependent variable in the third and fourth columns is a dummy variable for whether the groom 
married a bride of higher class than himself.  The first and third columns exclude brides without 
occupations; the second and forth columns include brides without occupations and impute their 
classes as described in Section 5.
The female occupation variables are expressed as percentages of the female labor force for the 
departement; the omitted category is workers.  Standard errors, clustered at the military region 
level, are presented in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
32Table 6.4: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, brides without occupation excluded (IV)
Panel A: Stage 1 regressions
Dependent variable: Sex Ratio
% of Soldiers Killed * Post War -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Rural 0.004* 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Female Proprietors 0.001* 0.001 0.001** 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% Female Employees -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Female Self-Employed 0.002*** 0.001* 0.002*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Female Unemployed -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.013 0.006 0.015 0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.018 -0.024* -0.022* -0.027**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Dummies as in Stage 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.790 0.775 0.794 0.778
Panel B: Stage 2 regressions
Dependent variable:
Sex Ratio 3.320** 3.613** -1.454** -1.564**
(1.640) (1.778) (0.618) (0.666)
Rural 0.216*** 0.223*** -0.043* -0.046**
(0.065) (0.064) (0.023) (0.022)
% Female Proprietors -0.009* -0.009* 0.003 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
% Female Employees -0.037*** -0.042*** 0.016*** 0.018***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005)
% Female Self-Employed -0.030*** -0.026*** 0.014*** 0.012***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
% Female Unemployed 0.017 0.050** -0.005 -0.023***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.006) (0.007)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.273 0.298 0.260* 0.236*
(0.397) (0.397) (0.138) (0.138)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.458 -0.418 -0.207 -0.224
(0.419) (0.423) (0.145) (0.146)
Year Dummies Yes No Yes No
Post-War Dummy No Yes No Yes
Groom Class Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Military Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.213 0.207 0.226 0.218
Observations 3,122 3,122 2,998 2,998
The female occupation variables are expressed as percentages of the female labor force for the departement; the omitted 
category is workers.  Standard errors, clustered at the military region x marriage year level, are presented in parentheses.  
Asterisks denote significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
class difference married up
Notes: Panel A shows the first stage of the IV regressions, where the sex ratio is regressed on military mortality interacted with 
post war, and controls; Panel B shows the second stage, where marriage outcomes are regressed on the instrumented sex ratio 
and controls.
The dependent variable in the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom (thus a greater class 
difference indicates the groom married a lower class of bride); the dependent variable in the third and fourth columns is a 
dummy variable for whether the groom married a bride of higher class than himself.  The sex ratio is defined as men aged 18-59 
divided by women aged 15-49 in the departement and census period.  Brides without occupations are excluded.
33Table 6.5: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, full sample (IV)
Panel A: Stage 1 regressions
Dependent variable: Sex Ratio
% of Soldiers Killed * Post War -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Rural 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Female Proprietors 0.001 0.000 0.001* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% Female Employees 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Female Self-Employed 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% Female Unemployed -0.007*** -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.018* 0.011 0.019* 0.012
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.019* -0.026** -0.022** -0.029**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Dummies as in Stage 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.758 0.738 0.759 0.738
Panel B: Stage 2 regressions
Dependent variable:
Sex Ratio 2.489** 2.662** -0.804* -0.865*
(1.204) (1.292) (0.477) (0.514)
Rural 0.206*** 0.206*** -0.051*** -0.051***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.014) (0.014)
% Female Proprietors -0.008** -0.008** 0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
% Female Employees -0.033*** -0.037*** 0.009*** 0.011***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004)
% Female Self-Employed -0.024*** -0.022*** 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
% Female Unemployed 0.015 0.034** -0.001 -0.012**
(0.012) (0.016) (0.005) (0.006)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.398 0.418 0.128 0.110
(0.276) (0.275) (0.102) (0.102)
Bride's Age (/100) 0.022 0.032 -0.170 -0.173
(0.312) (0.314) (0.112) (0.112)
Year Dummies Yes No Yes No
Post-War Dummy No Yes No Yes
Groom Class Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Military Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.188 0.185 0.402 0.399
Observations 4,997 4,997 4,834 4,834
The female occupation variables are expressed as percentages of the female labor force for the departement; the omitted 
category is workers.  Standard errors, clustered at the military region x marriage year level, are presented in parentheses.  
Asterisks denote significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
class difference married up
Notes: Panel A shows the first stage of the IV regressions, where the sex ratio is regressed on military mortality interacted with 
post war, and controls; Panel B shows the second stage, where marriage outcomes are regressed on the instrumented sex ratio 
and controls.
The dependent variable in the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom (thus a greater class 
difference indicates the groom married a lower class of bride); the dependent variable in the third and fourth columns is a 
dummy variable for whether the groom married a bride of higher class than himself.  The sex ratio is defined as men aged 18-
59 divided by women aged 15-49 in the departement and census period.  Brides without occupations have their classes 
imputed as described in Section 5.
34Table 6.6: Men marry up more when the sex ratio at age 18 is lower, brides without occupation excluded (IV)
Panel A: Stage 1 regressions
Dependent variable: Sex Ratio at age 18
% of Soldiers Killed * Post War -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rural 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Female Proprietors 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% Female Employees -0.002* -0.002 -0.002* -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Female Self-Employed 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Female Unemployed -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Groom's Age (/100) -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 -0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.008 -0.010 -0.013 -0.015
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Dummies as in Stage 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.812 0.809 0.815 0.811
Panel B: Stage 2 regressions
Dependent variable:
Sex Ratio at age 18 3.568** 3.785** -1.571** -1.652**
(1.767) (1.846) (0.671) (0.704)
Rural 0.217*** 0.222*** -0.044* -0.046**
(0.065) (0.064) (0.023) (0.023)
% Female Proprietors -0.009* -0.009* 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
% Female Employees -0.031*** -0.033*** 0.013*** 0.015***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004)
% Female Self-Employed -0.030*** -0.028*** 0.014*** 0.013***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
% Female Unemployed 0.005 0.022 0.000 -0.011**
(0.018) (0.014) (0.006) (0.005)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.332 0.345 0.236* 0.218
(0.401) (0.401) (0.139) (0.139)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.489 -0.465 -0.197 -0.206
(0.417) (0.420) (0.145) (0.145)
Year Dummies Yes No Yes No
Post-War Dummy No Yes No Yes
Groom Class Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Military Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.212 0.208 0.225 0.219
Observations 3,122 3,122 2,998 2,998
The female occupation variables are expressed as percentages of the female labor force for the departement; the omitted category 
is workers.  Standard errors, clustered at the military region x marriage year level, are presented in parentheses.  Asterisks denote 
significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
class difference married up
Notes: Panel A shows the first stage of the IV regressions, where the sex ratio when the groom was aged 18 is regressed on 
military mortality interacted with post war, and controls; Panel B shows the second stage, where marriage outcomes are 
regressed on the instrumented sex ratio and controls.
The dependent variable in the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom (thus a greater class 
difference indicates the groom married a lower class of bride); the dependent variable in the third and fourth columns is a 
dummy variable for whether the groom married a bride of higher class than himself.  The sex ratio at age 18 is defined as men 
aged 18-59 divided by women aged 15-49 in the departement and census period when the groom was 18.  Brides without 
occupations are excluded.
35Table 6.7: Men marry up more when the sex ratio at age 18 is lower, full sample (IV)
Panel A: Stage 1 regressions
Dependent variable: Sex Ratio at age 18
% of Soldiers Killed * Post War -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Rural 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Female Proprietors 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% Female Employees -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Female Self-Employed 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% Female Unemployed -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.003** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.000 -0.002 0.003 -0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.012 -0.015 -0.016 -0.019*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Dummies as in Stage 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.786 0.783 0.788 0.784
Panel B: Stage 2 regressions
Dependent variable:
Sex Ratio at age 18 2.637** 2.761** -0.855* -0.902*
(1.274) (1.334) (0.507) (0.537)
Rural 0.207*** 0.206*** -0.051*** -0.051***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.014) (0.014)
% Female Proprietors -0.007** -0.008** -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
% Female Employees -0.030*** -0.031*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
% Female Self-Employed -0.024*** -0.023*** 0.009*** 0.008***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
% Female Unemployed 0.006 0.014 0.002 -0.006
(0.012) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.441 0.454 0.115 0.099
(0.277) (0.276) (0.102) (0.102)
Bride's Age (/100) 0.007 0.004 -0.166 -0.164
(0.311) (0.312) (0.112) (0.112)
Year Dummies Yes No Yes No
Post-War Dummy No Yes No Yes
Groom Class Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Military Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.188 0.185 0.403 0.400
Observations 4,997 4,997 4,834 4,834
The female occupation variables are expressed as percentages of the female labor force for the departement; the omitted 
category is workers.  Standard errors, clustered at the military region x marriage year level, are presented in parentheses.  
Asterisks denote significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
class difference married up
Notes: Panel A shows the first stage of the IV regressions, where the sex ratio when the groom was aged 18 is regressed on 
military mortality interacted with post war, and controls; Panel B shows the second stage, where marriage outcomes are 
regressed on the instrumented sex ratio and controls.
The dependent variable in the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom (thus a greater class 
difference indicates the groom married a lower class of bride); the dependent variable in the third and fourth columns is a 
dummy variable for whether the groom married a bride of higher class than himself.   The sex ratio at age 18 is defined as men 
aged 18-59 divided by women aged 15-49 in the departement and census period when the groom was 18.  Brides without 
occupations have their classes imputed as described in Section 5.
36Table A1: Regression for the imputation of bride's class for brides without occupations
Dependent variable: bride's class coefficient standard error
Class 1 Father -0.872* (0.455)
Class 2 Father -0.522** (0.247)
Class 3 Father -0.092 (0.208)
Class 4 Father 0.063 (0.232)
Class 5 Father 0.178 (0.224)
Class 6 Father 0.093 (0.233)
Class 7 Father 0.005 (0.503)
Class 1 Mother -0.384 (0.562)
Class 2 Mother -0.992*** (0.277)
Class 3 Mother -1.059*** (0.252)
Class 4 Mother -0.064 (0.283)
Class 5 Mother -0.076 (0.175)
Class 6 Mother 0.172 (0.246)
Class 7 Mother -0.525 (1.262)
Father has missing occupation because he's dead 0.025 (0.174)
Mother has missing occupation because she's dead -0.010 (0.160)
Father has no Occupation 0.248 (0.446)
Mother has no Occupation -0.135 (0.179)
Rural 0.325 (0.303)
Rural Interacted With:
Class 1 Father 0.265 (0.673)
Class 2 Father -0.040 (0.570)
Class 3 Father -0.130 (0.393)
Class 4 Father -0.003 (0.347)
Class 5 Father -0.241 (0.388)
Class 6 Father -0.145 (0.759)
Class 7 Father 0.172 (0.582)
Class 1 Mother 0.350 (1.101)
Class 2 Mother 1.150* (0.597)
Class 3 Mother 1.245** (0.498)
Class 4 Mother -0.263 (0.358)
Class 5 Mother 0.140 (0.271)
Class 6 Mother 0.771 (0.515)
Class 7 Mother 1.278 (1.299)
Father has missing occupation because he's dead -0.103 (0.308)
Mother has missing occupation because she's dead -0.120 (0.270)
Father has no Occupation 0.477 (0.774)
Mother has no Occupation -0.410 (0.326)
Paris -0.249* (0.142)
Big City 0.033 (0.191)
Medium Sized City 0.131 (0.153)
Bride's Age -0.107*** (0.030)
Bride's Age Squared 0.168*** (0.047)





Notes: Observations are pre-war marriages where the bride's class is not missing.  The omitted category 
for parent's class is missing class for unknown reason. The omitted category for city size is small city or 
other area.
37Dependent variable: class difference married up
imputed imputed
% of Soldiers Killed * Post War -0.053* 0.014**
(0.026) (0.006)




% Female Proprietors -0.017*** 0.002*
(0.003) (0.001)
% Female Employees -0.055*** 0.015***
(0.010) (0.004)
% Female Self-Employed -0.016* 0.006*
(0.009) (0.003)
% Female Unemployed -0.012 0.002
(0.020) (0.006)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.054 0.200*
(0.265) (0.100)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.272 -0.222*
(0.510) (0.129)
Post-War Dummy Yes Yes
Groom Class Dummies Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.194 0.198
Observations 4,297 4,151
Notes: The dependent variable in the first column is the class of the bride minus the class of the 
groom (thus a greater class difference indicates the groom married a lower class of bride); the 
dependent variable in the second column is a dummy variable for whether the groom married a 
bride of higher class than himself.  Bride class is imputed for brides with no occupation using the 
class of the bride's father.
The female occupation variables are expressed as percentages of the female labor force for the 
departement; the omitted category is workers.  Standard errors, clustered at the military region 
level, are presented in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Table A2: Men marry up more where military mortality was higher, imputing brides without 
occupation with father’s class
38Table A3: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, imputing brides without occupation with father’s class (IV)
Panel A: Stage 1 regressions
Dependent variable: Sex Ratio
% of Soldiers Killed * Post War -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Rural 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Female Proprietors 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% Female Employees 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Female Self-Employed 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% Female Unemployed -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.019* 0.011 0.021* 0.012
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.026** -0.035*** -0.030** -0.039***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Dummies as in Stage 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.758 0.739 0.759 0.740
Panel B: Stage 2 regressions
Dependent variable:
Sex Ratio 1.476 1.704 -0.662 -0.751
(1.700) (1.791) (0.604) (0.621)
Rural 0.160*** 0.162*** -0.036** -0.036**
(0.054) (0.054) (0.017) (0.017)
% Female Proprietors -0.007 -0.007* 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
% Female Employees -0.036*** -0.040*** 0.013*** 0.015***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004)
% Female Self-Employed -0.029*** -0.027*** 0.012*** 0.011***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
% Female Unemployed 0.017 0.038* -0.005 -0.016**
(0.018) (0.021) (0.006) (0.007)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.203 0.232 0.194 0.173
(0.384) (0.385) (0.128) (0.129)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.340 -0.328 -0.236* -0.243*
(0.416) (0.418) (0.140) (0.139)
Year Dummies Yes No Yes No
Post-War Dummy No Yes No Yes
Groom Class Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Military Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.209 0.207 0.207 0.203
Observations 4,297 4,297 4,151 4,151
The female occupation variables are expressed as percentages of the female labor force for the departement; the omitted category 
is workers.  Standard errors, clustered at the military region x marriage year level, are presented in parentheses.  Asterisks denote 
significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
class difference married up
Notes: Panel A shows the first stage of the IV regressions, where the sex ratio is regressed on military mortality interacted with 
post war, and controls; Panel B shows the second stage, where marriage outcomes are regressed on the instrumented sex ratio and 
controls.
The dependent variable in the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom (thus a greater class 
difference indicates the groom married a lower class of bride); the dependent variable in the third and fourth columns is a dummy 
variable for whether the groom married a bride of higher class than himself.  Brides without occupations are given the classes of 
their fathers.
39Table A4: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, brides without occupation excluded (OLS)
Dependent variable:
Sex Ratio 0.587 0.421 -0.096 0.028
(0.648) (0.632) (0.218) (0.212)
Rural 0.228*** 0.235*** -0.048** -0.050**
(0.065) (0.065) (0.023) (0.022)
% Female Proprietors -0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
% Female Employees -0.028*** -0.029*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004)
% Female Self-Employed -0.026*** -0.023*** 0.012*** 0.011***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
% Female Unemployed 0.007 0.023 -0.001 -0.009*
(0.018) (0.015) (0.006) (0.005)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.312 0.321 0.239* 0.223
(0.398) (0.396) (0.139) (0.137)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.525 -0.515 -0.170 -0.171
(0.413) (0.413) (0.146) (0.145)
Year Dummies Yes No Yes No
Post-War Dummy No Yes No Yes
Groom Class Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Military Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.218 0.215 0.236 0.232
Observations 3,122 3,122 2,998 2,998
class difference married up
Notes: The dependent variable in the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom 
(thus a greater class difference indicates the groom married a lower class of bride); the dependent variable in the 
third and fourth columns is a dummy variable for whether the groom married a bride of higher class than 
himself.  The sex ratio is defined as men aged 18-59 divided by women aged 15-49 in the departement and 
census period.  Brides without occupations are excluded.
The female occupation variables are expressed as percentages of the female labor force for the departement; the 
omitted category is workers.  Standard errors, clustered at the military region x marriage year level, are 
presented in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
40Table A5: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, full sample (OLS)
Dependent variable:
Sex Ratio 0.448 0.382 -0.071 0.000
(0.373) (0.368) (0.135) (0.133)
Rural 0.213*** 0.213*** -0.053*** -0.053***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.014) (0.014)
% Female Proprietors -0.005** -0.005** -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
% Female Employees -0.026*** -0.026*** 0.006** 0.007**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
% Female Self-Employed -0.019*** -0.018*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
% Female Unemployed 0.008 0.012 0.001 -0.004
(0.012) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.439 0.449 0.112 0.097
(0.275) (0.273) (0.103) (0.102)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.031 -0.043 -0.148 -0.142
(0.305) (0.305) (0.112) (0.111)
Year Dummies Yes No Yes No
Post-War Dummy No Yes No Yes
Groom Class Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Military Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.193 0.191 0.406 0.404
Observations 4,997 4,997 4,834 4,834
class difference married up
Notes: The dependent variable in the first two columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom 
(thus a greater class difference indicates the groom married a lower class of bride); the dependent variable in the 
third and fourth columns is a dummy variable for whether the groom married a bride of higher class than 
himself.  The sex ratio is defined as men aged 18-59 divided by women aged 15-49 in the departement and 
census period.  Brides without occupations have their classes imputed as described in Section 5.
The female occupation variables are expressed as percentages of the female labor force for the departement; the 
omitted category is workers.  Standard errors, clustered at the military region x marriage year level, are 
presented in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
41Appendix B: Variable definitions 
 
Dependent variables:  
Bride minus groom class:  This variable is a marriage-level variable equal to the class of the bride 
minus the class of the groom. 
Married up:  This variable is a marriage-level dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bride is in 
at least as high a class as the groom.  
See Section 5 for class definition. 
 
Main independent variables: 
Military mortality (percentage of soldiers killed): We use Huber’s (1931) data on the percentage of 
soldiers (excluding officers) reported dead or missing.  These data are available by the military region 
in which the soldiers enlisted.  We map military regions to départments and thus marriages.   
Sex ratio:  The sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 years divided by the number of 
women aged 15 to 49 years.  It is defined at the département level for each census period, namely 
1911, 1921 and 1926.  Thus marriages in the period 1909 to 1914 take the value from 1911, marriages 
in the period 1918 to 1923 take the value from 1921, and marriages in the period 1924 to 1928 take the 
value from 1926. 
Sex ratio at age 18:  This variable is the same as the sex ratio. Marriages are assigned sex ratios of the 
census year which is the closest to when the groom turn 18. We however do not allocate pre-war sex 
ratios to post war marriages, because it seems implausible that men pre war would have predicted the 
high military mortality rate and thus delayed marriage in order to face less competition in the marriage 
market.  
 
Other control variables: 
Military regions:  We use the 22 military regions that existed at the end of WWI.  Of the three 
départements Moselle, Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin, which were gained from Germany in 1919, only 
Moselle is allocated to a military region and thus a military mortality rate.  However, we do not have 
département-level data for Moselle pre war, so only its post war marriages are included in the 
regressions. 
Female occupation variables (% proprietors, % employees, % unemployed, % self-employed):  
In the censuses of 1906, 1921 and 1926, the female labor force is categorized into five groups: 
proprietors (typically owners of very small stores), employees, workers, unemployed and self-
employed.  With workers as the omitted category, we use four variables for the percentage of the 
female labor force that falls into each of the other categories at the département level.  Marriages in the 
period 1909 to 1914 take the values from the 1906 census.  Marriages in the period 1918 to 1923 take 
the values from the 1921 census; marriages in the period 1924 to 1928 take the values from the 1926 
census.  
Rural: This a dummy variable defined at the marriage level.  It is defined in terms of the 
administrative status of the place of marriage, which may take the values chef lieu de département, 
chef lieu d'arrondissement, chef-lieu de canton, and rural.  We consider the category rural to indicate a 
rural marriage, and the other three categories to indicate urban marriages. 
Groom’s age:  The age of the groom is constructed from three marriage-level variables: the age of the 
groom, the year of the marriage and the groom’s year of birth.  If the stated age of the groom falls in 
the range 10 to 89, this is the value used.  If it does not, or the age of the groom is missing, we use the 
difference between the year of marriage and the groom’s year of birth if this falls in the range 10 to 89.  
Otherwise the groom’s age is missing.   
Bride’s age: Same as groom’s age. 
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